·         “Sustainability” is broadly defined and includes not just environmental initiatives, but also social objectives (e.g. labour and human rights).

·         Guidance on sustainability agreements that fall outside the scope of Article 101(1):

o    Examples include the creation of databases — for the purposes of fulfilling sustainability due diligence obligations — on the (un)sustainability of supply chain partners, provided there is no obligation/prohibition on parties to purchase/sell; and the organisation of industry-wide awareness campaigns (provided that these do not amount to joint advertising of specific products).

·         Broad view of consumer benefits that are relevant to the competitive analysis, including:  (i) individual use value (e.g. improved product quality or variety); (ii) individual non-use value (where the consumers’ use experience with the product is not directly improved, but consumers value the impact of their sustainable consumption on others); and (iii) collective benefits (where, irrespective of the consumers’ individual appreciation of the product, objective benefits accrue to a wider part of society not just consumers in the relevant market).

o    Note: The EC’s view of benefits is not as broad as that taken by the UK and Dutch competition authorities who may consider benefits for wider society as a whole – rather than only those for the consumers of the products in the relevant markets.

·         A new “soft safe harbour” for sustainability standards, subject to six conditions:  (i) transparency and all interested competitors must be able to participate, (ii) voluntary participation, (iii) freedom to adopt a higher standard (although minimum standard can be imposed), (iv) no exchange of commercially sensitive information (v) open and non-discriminatory access; (vi) the sustainability standard must not lead to a “significant” increase in price or “significant” reduction in quality of the products, or the combined market share of the participants must not exceed 20% on any relevant market affected by the standard.

·         Sustainability considerations also relevant for the assessment of efficiencies (e.g. those generated by joint production agreements) under Article 101(3) TFEU.

·         Guidance on information exchange in the context of other types of horizontal cooperation agreements (e.g. joint purchasing, joint production, or joint commercialisation agreement).

·         Updated overview of the types of information exchange that are considered as restrictions of competition “by object”.

·         Guidance on the use of algorithms.

·         Limited guidance on exchanges of information in the context of M&A and stemming from regulatory initiatives.

·         Practical measures that companies can take to avoid infringements, with limited guidance on clean teams and public distancing.

·         Dual distribution – statement that certain information exchanges in the context of dual distribution may be covered by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation.  Please see our previous alert on the VBER.

o    Buyer cartels, which are a restriction of competition “by object”, are agreements or concerted practices between purchasers that, without engaging in joint negotiations with the supplier, coordinate the purchasers’ individual competitive behaviour in the purchasing market or the individual negotiations amongst suppliers and buyers.  A buyer cartel may also exist where purchasers agree to exchange commercially sensitive information outside any genuine joint purchasing agreement.

o    Joint negotiation of purchasing conditions by buyers in genuine purchasing agreements, i.e. where buyers make it clear to suppliers that the negotiations are conducted jointly on behalf of participating buyers, is not considered a restriction by object, but the effects on competition need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

·         Expanded description of the risk of harm to competition on the supply side where parties to a purchasing agreement have a significant degree of buying power on the purchasing market.

·         Clarification of circumstances in which it is less likely that lower prices will be passed onto consumers, e.g. joint purchasing arrangements that limit or disincentivise the ability of its members to purchase additional volumes from a given supplier, as these have the effect of limiting the volume of sales in the selling market.

o    E.g. when they allow parties to execute projects that they would not be able to undertake individually (e.g. due to complexity or size of project).

o    Restricting participation may be permitted in certain circumstances, e.g. where there is competition between several standards and standard development organisations, or where the restriction is limited in time and with a view to progressing quickly.

·         Clarification that disclosure of a maximum accumulated royalty rate by parties to a standardisation agreement is not generally anti-competitive.

·         Inclusion of more elements for conducting an assessment of whether a proposed licensee fee is FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory).

·         Acknowledgment that NSAs do not restrict competition “by object”, “unless they serve as a tool to engage in a cartel”.  However, according to the guidelines, NSAs may have an anti-competitive “effect”, and “will always require an individual assessment under Article 101”.

·         List of factors relevant to individual assessment under Article 101 (e.g. the type and depth of sharing, the geographic scope and market coverage of the NSA, and the market structure and characteristics).

·         List of minimum conditions required for NSAs not to be considered, prima facie, as likely to have restrictive effects (e.g. the participating operators must each control and manage their own core network, maintain independent retail and wholesale operations, maintain the ability to follow independent spectrum strategies, and not exchange commercially sensitive information beyond what is strictly necessary for the mobile infrastructure sharing to function).

·         Explanation of the pertinent factors for evaluating the anti-competitive effects of the main categories of agreements (passive, active, and spectrum sharing agreements).

·         A new example of sustainability agreement relating to international treaties that falls outside the scope of Article 101:  “agreements that aim solely to ensure compliance with sufficiently precise requirements or prohibitions in legally binding international treaties, agreements or conventions, whether or not they have been implemented in national law (for example, compliance with fundamental social rights or prohibitions on the use of child labour, the logging of certain types of tropical wood or the use of certain pollutants) and which are not fully implemented or enforced by a signatory State”.

·         Confirmation that a price increase arising from a standard may be insignificant where “the product covered by the sustainability standard represents only a small input cost for the product”.

·         Confirmation that there may be a time lag before benefits arise.  This lag does not exclude the application of an exemption under Article 101(3), although the greater the time lag, the greater the efficiencies must be

·         Confirmation that even in the presence of regulation, sustainability agreements may still be indispensable, for example by achieving the goal more quickly.

·         A footnote that explains that “even though consumers may be willing to pay for a sustainable product, a restrictive agreement may still be indispensable, for instance, to overcome a first-mover disadvantage or to achieve cost-reducing economies of scale”.

·         A 20% market share threshold is included as one of the alternative conditions to qualify for the “soft safe harbour” exemption.

o    This means that agreements that lead to a “significant” increase in price or “significant” reduction in quality of the products may still benefit from the soft safe harbour if the combined market share of the participants does not exceed 20% on any relevant market affected by the standard.

·         Removed a requirement to have a mechanism or a monitoring system in place to ensure compliance with the sustainability standard.

·         Inclusion of a table providing a framework for assessing the risk of liability for the exchange of commercially sensitive information in various contexts (e.g. direct or indirect exchange, or public disclosure).

·         Confirmation that the assessment of whether an exchange of information in the context of an acquisition process is subject to Article 101 “depends on which stage the acquisition process is at”.

·         Expanded guidance on the use of algorithms, including warnings that:  “Just like an employee or an outside consultant working under a firm’s “direction or control”, an algorithm remains under the firm’s control, and therefore the firm is liable even if its actions were informed by algorithms”.

·         Confirmation that the exchange of raw data may be less commercially sensitive than the exchange of data that has already been processed, in particular where each party uses its own proprietary method of processing the raw data.

·         More detailed guidance on what constitutes anti-competitive signalling through public announcements.

·         A new example of when a shared database may raise antitrust issues.

·         New examples of self-assessment analysis (e.g. regarding public announcements and data sharing to combat counterfeiting).

·         Limited additional guidance on practical measures to reduce risk e.g. minute taking and public distancing.

·         Explanation of the potential pro-competitive effects of data pools.

·         Inclusion of a box containing specific examples of when efficiencies may be taken into account in an Article 101 (3) assessment.

·         In both block exemptions:  simplified grace periods if market shares increase above the threshold for exemption, and new methods of calculating market shares if the preceding calendar year is not representative.

·         Compared to the 2022 R&D Block Exemption draft, the EC has removed an exclusion of R&D agreements where there would remain less than three competing R&D efforts in addition to and comparable to the parties, which appears to be helpful, in particular given that it may be difficult for the parties to assess how many competitors continue to engage in parallel R&D efforts.

·         In the Specialisation Block Exemption, there is an expanded definition of “unilateral specialisation agreement” to cover more than two parties (the former exemption only referred to agreements between two parties).