As Efficient Competitor

Abuse of dominance, As Efficient Competitor, European Commission, European Court of Justice, Guidance, Guidelines, Margin squeeze, Restriction by effect

(Norton Rose Fulbright, Belgium)/ /Leave a comment

The European Commission (the Commission) has launched a project to codify EU law on the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to exclusionary abuses of dominant positions, such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, predatory pricing, refusals to supply and margin squeezes. The Commission published a…

Abuse of dominance, Amazon, As Efficient Competitor, Commitments, Discrimination, European Commission

(University of Copenhagen)/ /Leave a comment

For unknown reasons, DG COMP persists in hiding the jewels when it comes to discrimination cases. This covers BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG from 2004, where DG COMP established (recital 93) how Article 102 TFEU covers three forms of discrimination, two exclusionary and one exploitive. As explained later, these have been referred to as horizontal-, vertical-, and…

Abuse of dominance, Advantage, As Efficient Competitor, Burden of Proof, Competition proceedings, Consumer welfare, Discrimination, Electricity, European Court of Justice, Italy, National competition authorities (NCAs), National court

(University of Brescia)/ /Leave a comment

Facts and court proceedings Before the start of the liberalization process in 1999 with Legislative Decree 79/1999 (“Decreto Bersani”), the Italian electricity market was run singlehandedly by the Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (Enel), born with the nationalization of electricity in 1962. As the former Italian legal monopolist, Enel was integrated into all stages of the…

Abuse of dominance, As Efficient Competitor, Economics, European Court of Justice, European Union, Exclusive dealing, Italy, National competition authorities (NCAs), National court, References for a preliminary ruling

, , (White & Case)/ /Leave a comment

On 19 January 2023, the EU Court of Justice, answering questions from the Italian Council of State, confirmed that the Intel effects-based approach applies also to exclusive dealing practices and held that competition authorities must duly examine economic evidence produced by dominant undertakings. The court also held that, under certain narrow circumstances, conduct implemented by…

As Efficient Competitor, Sustainability, Tax, United States of America

(European University Institute)/ /Leave a comment

Competition law mainly deals with microeconomic issues. Price theory orients its application, with price, supply, demand, and information being important parameters. However, microeconomics does not have a monopoly on influencing competition and competition law. Macroeconomic developments have roles to play as well. These roles may materialize in the form of monetary and budgetary policies. For…

Abuse of dominance, Advantage, Anticompetitive agreements, As Efficient Competitor, Burden of Proof, European Commission, Fines, General Court of the European Union, Google, Market definition, Tying and Bundling

(University of Mannheim)/ /Leave a comment

The long-awaited Google Android decision is out (see the press release here or the full text here). The General Court has dismissed Google’s action almost in its entirety, slightly reducing the record fine from 4.343 billion euros to (still a record) 4.125 billion euros. This post gives a very first overview of the judgment and…

Abuse of dominance, As Efficient Competitor, Economics, Effects-based, Fundamental rights, General Court of the European Union, Procedures

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The General Court of the European Union delivered a blow to the European Commission in fully annulling its Qualcomm (exclusivity payments) decision of 2018 and a EUR 997 million fine. Qualcomm v Commission[1] is the first annulment of an Article 102 TFEU decision adopted by Commissioner Margrethe Vestager. The judgment is notably based on the…

Abuse of dominance, As Efficient Competitor, Burden of Proof, European Union, General Court of the European Union, Rebates, Standard of Proof

, (White & Case) and (White & Case, Belgium)/ /Leave a comment

On 26 January 2022, the EU’s General Court (GC) annulled the European Commission’s (EC) €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing a dominant position with its rebate schemes.[1] The judgment demonstrates that the European Courts are prepared to look in detail at evidence and economic analysis in antitrust cases, and will annul EC decisions if…