An amalgamation or joining of two or more firms into an existing firm or to form a new firm. A merger is a method by which firms can increase their size and expand into existing or new economic activities and markets. A variety of motives may exist for mergers: to increase economic efficiency, to acquire market power, to diversify, to expand into different geographic markets, to pursue financial and R&D synergies, etc. Mergers are classified into three types:
Horizontal Merger: Merger between firms that produce and sell the same products, i.e., between competing firms. Horizontal mergers, if significant in size, can reduce competition in a market and are often reviewed by competition authorities. Horizontal mergers can be viewed as horizontal integration of firms in a market or across markets.
Vertical Merger: Merger between firms operating at different stages of production, e.g., from raw materials to finished products to distribution. An example would be a steel manufacturer merging with an iron ore producer.
Vertical mergers usually increase economic efficiency, although they may sometimes have an anticompetitive effect.
Conglomerate Merger: Merger between firms in unrelated business, e.g., between an automobile manufacturer and a food processing firm.
Source: OECD
On 24 July, the Commission published the non-confidential version of the decision in the Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria case. The case, cleared subject to commitments following a Phase II investigation, represents a significant development in the Commission’s merger enforcement policy because, for the first time, the Commission has applied an Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP)-analysis as…
On 25 June 2013, the European Commission launched a public consultation entitled “Towards more effective EU Merger Control” in which the Commission proposes to (i) expand its powers to review non-controlling minority interests and (ii) streamline the case referral system between the Commission and NCAs. The proposals in respect of minority shareholdings will have a…
Like the European Commission, I am confident that the European Merger Simplification Project will bring benefits for clients. As many commentators have affirmed, I do not doubt that the increase of the currently applicable market share thresholds for the identification of horizontally and vertically “affected markets” by 5 per cent to 20% and 30% respectively…
Competition Law in Canada – Top 10 Issues for 2013 This is a post of an article written by my partners Anita Banicevic, Richard Elliott, Charles Tingley and me **************************************** 2012 was a busy year for competition law and policy in Canada. Below we consider how some of the important developments in 2012 will shape…
The Austrian Parliament has passed a bill amending the Austrian competition law rules. On March 1, 2013, significant changes will enter into force. These include the following: This is the follow-up to the post “Austria: New competition rules – Take one”. Strengthening of private enforcement The legislator made efforts to promote private enforcement. This is…
My U.S. colleagues Lee van Voorhis and Brian Rafkin wrote an excellent client alert on the Bosch case and I asked them to prepare the following short summary for the Kluwer readership: On November 26, 2012, the FTC and Robert Bosch GmbH entered into a Consent Agreement that resolved the FTC’s inquiry into Bosch’s $1…
In contrast to e.g. the UK Office of Fair Trading, the European Commission so far has not applied UPP-type approaches in phase I merger enquiries. However, a Commission submission to the OECD earlier this year indicates that it is keeping its options open. This post discusses frequently asked questions regarding the concept of UPP and…
The Commission published the text of its most recent prohibition decision in Deutsche Boerse / NYSE Euronext. The Decision is lengthy and the Commission appears to have formulated a response to most arguments proffered by the parties. However, a review of the Decision brings to the fore a number of ways in which the Commission…
Many new economic analysis tools have been introduced, particularly for merger analysis during the last decade. Some of these tools have also raised considerable public interest. For instance, probably not many have avoided hearing of the UPP test, and undoubtedly many are already familiar with the meaning of the abbreviations GUPPI, IPR and CMCR. The…
In 2007, the European Commission prohibited Ryanair’s attempted hostile bid to acquire rival Irish airline, Aer Lingus. It also refused to order Ryanair to divest its 29.8% stake in Aer Lingus, which it had built up during its aborted public bid. The General Court later upheld both the prohibition of the merger and the refusal to require divestment of the minority shareholding. Subsequently, the UK Office of Fair Trading investigated Ryanair’s minority shareholding in Aer Lingus; Ryanair’s challenges to the OFT’s jurisdiction were rejected by both the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal. On 1 June the Supreme Court refused Ryanair leave to appeal, thus confirming the OFT’s ability to investigate the transaction, which it referred to the Competition Commission on 15 June. However, immediately thereafter, Ryanair launched a third hostile bid to acquire Aer Lingus, leading to further litigation before the CAT to challenge the Competition Commission’s jurisdiction.
This blog post examines the complex interaction of European Commission and national authority jurisdiction to examine different transactions involving the same parties, as well as the OFT’s reasons for referring Ryanair’s minority shareholding to the Competition Commission.
